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ABSTRACT 
Price-Earnings (PE) ratio is widely used as the key indicator for many value 
investment strategies. Existing studies use market beta as the risk-adjustment measure 
to modify PE strategies. In this study, we use financial and operating leverage ratios to 
control risks when forming low PE strategies. Our results show that, when compared to 
the market and traditional low PE firms, the less leveraged low PE firms yield higher 
returns and greatly reduce the portfolio risk. Further investigation indicates that the 
outperformance is mainly contributed by the bearish market returns, a finding that helps 
explain the contradiction to the expected risk-reward relationship. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Price-Earnings (PE) ratio is widely used in investment strategies to identify undervalued 
stocks. Past empirical studies have shown inconsistent results when the relationship between 
low PE ratios and higher returns is examined. 
When higher returns are observed in low PE portfolios, investment professionals and 
scholars have generally responded in the following two ways. Firstly, some believe that the 
market is efficient, and the superior returns represent merely compensations for extra risks 
inherent in the low PE portfolios. On the contrary, some argue that the market efficiency does 
not hold, and therefore low PE portfolios identify undervalued stocks. 
In this study, we investigate the relation between PE and stock returns. We test investment 
strategies where PE portfolio risk is controlled with an innovative approach. We measure the 
risks of a company with debt-to-asset and operating margin ratios instead of beta, the traditional 
measure of risks in past literatures. 
With twenty years of returns observed from three annually-rebalanced portfolios, we find 
superior performance of the low PE portfolio compared to the market benchmark. Moreover, 
our stock selection strategy that considers the PE ratio, financial leverage, and cost-structure of 
firms has proven to be successful. This strategy not only outperforms the market return while 
reducing the overall portfolio risk, but also it is an outstanding bearish-market strategy. 
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section, introduction, is a literature review 
of previous articles on PE ratio studies, followed by a brief summary of the difference between 
our study and previous research. The second section documents the data and methodology. We 
present and analyze the final results, discuss the limitations of the study and provide suggestions 
for further research in section three. Section four concludes our study. 
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1.1 Literature review 
Basu (1977) was the first researcher to conduct a comprehensive study on value and 
growth strategies of stock investments. He found that the annual holding period return of a low 
PE portfolio was higher than that of a high PE portfolio during the period of August 1956 to 
September 1971. Ever since, researchers have presented a variety of explanations for this result, 
and the two major explanations for this result are the “risk” and “market inefficiency” 
hypotheses. 
The risk hypothesis in PE studies was proposed by Fama and French (1992). They 
suggested that the stocks with lower PE ratios are fundamentally riskier than those with higher 
PE ratios; consequently, a better return is required as a compensation for investors undertaking 
this risk. This hypothesis was further examined and supported by Chen and Zhang (1998). They 
studied the relationship between PE ratios and return around six countries and concluded that 
companies with low PE ratios were riskier because they were usually firms under distress, with 
high financial leverage, and facing uncertainty in future earnings.  
However, the risk hypothesis was challenged by results in Siegel (1995) and Beneda 
(2002). Siegel (1995) argued that stocks with high PE ratio yielded a lower market return 
because previous studies were based on relatively short-term analysis. The price of value stocks 
is based on near term expected cash flows, while the cash flows of growth stock (high PE ratio 
stock) are not realized for many years. Siegel scrutinized the long term performance of high PE 
portfolios and found that they outperformed the US market from 1974 to 1995. However, he 
also found that the high PE portfolio slightly underperformed the market from 1972 to 1995 in 
the US. This result implies that the performance of the growth portfolio (high PE firms) is 
affected by the 1972 to 1974 bear market. Beneda (2002) compared the long term average return 
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of high, mid and low PE firms using US stock market data from 1984 to 2001. Her findings 
indicated that the average return of high PE firms actually outperform that of low PE portfolio 
over long holding periods up to 18 years. She also suggested that the performance of PE 
portfolios is related to the market conditions and investors’ holding period length.  
Some researchers have attempted to incorporate the notion of risk, measured by the 
companies’ betas, into PE-related investment strategies by either using it as an additional 
selection criterion or a return adjustment tool. Estrada (2003) adjusted normal PE ratios by a 
stock’s beta and dividend growth rate and found that portfolios formed with low PE ratios 
adjusted by risk and growth outperform traditional low PE portfolios. Cheh, Kim, and Zheng 
(2008) compared the performance of value and growth stocks before and after risk adjustment. 
Before the risk adjustment, high PE portfolio significantly outperforms the low PE portfolios. 
After risk was considered, the result is totally reversed: the low PE portfolio outperforms the 
high PE portfolio. These findings imply that risk factors could have substantial impact on the 
performance of a PE portfolio. Nonetheless, the most commonly-used risk measure, beta, cannot 
fully represent all types of risks a firm faces, and therefore we believe that other risk measures 
may serve as risk indicators as well. 
The market inefficiency hypothesis is the second major argument for the superior 
performance of low PE portfolios. Researchers provide different interpretations of this 
hypothesis. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) viewed it from a contrarian perspective. In 
their paper, they argued that some stocks become the underpriced “value” stocks due to 
overselling on the part of uninformed investors when they observe a prolonged period of 
underperformance. On the other hand, when naive investors are induced to overbuy certain 
stocks due to their continuous over-performance, these stocks become the overpriced “growth” 
stocks. Investors employing the contrarian strategies bet on the naive investors by 
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disproportionally buying value stocks and underinvesting growth stocks to catch excess return 
over the market. Debondt and Thaler (1985) and Haugen (1994) both proved that portfolios 
based on contrarian strategies outperform the market. 
Campbell and Shiller (1998) and Jones (2008) interpreted market inefficiency hypothesis 
in terms of a mean-reverting feature in PE ratios. Campbell and Shiller (1998) argued that high 
PE ratios infer poor future performance because the ratios will return to their historical means. 
Jones (2008) proved that an investor can earn higher long-term average return from buying a 
well-diversified, large-cap and low PE portfolio, and selling it when the ratio is slowly rising to 
its historical mean. Jones also suggested that low PE ratio has a stronger positive impact on 
stock return over a holding period shorter than 30 years. 
Although Beneda (2002) does not agree with Fama and French (1992) on the risk 
hypothesis perspective, they both related their research results to an efficient market. Fama and 
French (1992) thought the market was efficient because the investors, who bought the low PE 
stocks and undertook higher risk, were compensated for higher returns. In contrast, Beneda 
(2002), who showed the long term performance of growth (high PE) stocks were better than that 
of value (low PE) stocks, also held that market was efficient, because PE ratios actually 
reflected what investors expected about the future growth opportunities. 
Aside from the two discussed major arguments for PE portfolio performance, other 
findings showed that the market conditions and holding period influence the performance of PE 
portfolio. Siegel (1995) and Cheh, Kim, and Zheng (2008) used data from different time periods, 
and both found that high PE portfolio perform better than low PE portfolio in a bull market 
while the opposite is true if the market is bearish. Siegel (1995), Beneda (2002) and Cheh, Kim, 
and Zheng (2008) all concluded that high PE portfolios outperform low PE portfolios when the 
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holding period is longer. In addition, Cheh, Kim, and Zheng (2008) found that shorter holding 
periods improved the return of low PE risk-adjusted portfolios. 
1.2 Purpose 
 Previous studies have used beta as a risk adjustment measure. Although beta is a useful 
measure of the stock price volatility relative to the market, it has two disadvantages. Firstly, it 
does not incorporate new information. Beta is calculated based on past price information, and 
therefore might not be a good predictor for a stock’s future performance. Secondly, it does not 
directly reflect a stock’s fundamentals, such as its debt level and earning condition. Therefore, 
in our paper, we use Debt-to-Asset ratio and operating margin as the risk indicators to 
supplement PE ratio when forming portfolios. Debt-to-Asset ratio is a financial leverage 
measure reflecting the portion of a company’s assets financed by debts; it measures a firm’s 
credit risk. Operating margin, calculated as operating income divided by Sales, is a reverse 
indicator of operating risk. We have chosen EBITDA, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortization expenses, to be the measure of operating income. Lower fixed costs, and 
therefore a higher EBITDA would result in a higher operating margin, indicating lower 
operating risk; the operating margin therefore serves as our operating leverage measure. Since 
the inputs in the two leverage ratios signify a firm’s fundamentals and can be updated on a 
yearly basis using annual financial statements, the two leverage ratios qualify for effective risk 
indicators.   
We use a risk-control approach to study a low PE portfolio. The main purpose of our 
study is to investigate whether the low PE portfolios, risk adjusted by financial and operating 
leverage, outperform the market. Since the portfolios are controlled at different leverage level, 
the low PE portfolio with higher leverage level should earn higher return than the other two 
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portfolios if the market efficiency hypothesis holds. In addition, we observe the annual portfolio 
returns over the 20-year period to detect whether the low PE portfolios perform better in bearish 
markets, as suggested by the several previous researchers. 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Data Selection 
In order to perform our analysis, we use both financial statement data from Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat North America database and security prices and returns from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Also, to observe the behavior of the portfolio returns 
during both market peaks and troughs, 21 years of data, starting from 1987 to 2007, is extracted 
from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), a database providing access to both 
Compustat and CRSP, to produce 20 years of portfolio returns from year 1987 to 2006. 
From Compustat database, we extract annual financial statement data including fiscal 
yearend date, earnings announcement date, current portion of long term debt, long term debt, 
assets, sales, earnings per share (EPS), and earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) for individual companies over the 21-year timeframe.  
From CRSP database, we obtain month-end prices and returns for each stock. Then, we 
calculate the annual return on these stocks by summing up the log of monthly returns minus one 
(𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = [𝑒 LN 1+𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡 𝑕𝑙𝑦  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  ]− 1). The annual returns are calculated on April 
30
th
 each year and therefore the 2006 annual return is computed using May 2006 to April 2007 
returns. We calculate annual returns even if one or two months of return data are not available. 
By doing this, we assume zero returns during these periods of missing returns. There are two 
reasons why we make this assumption. First, the zero return assumption should not introduce 
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significant upward or downward bias. Second, this assumption allows us to keep a larger set of 
data and therefore more representative results. 
As described earlier, the portfolio selection strategy we propose requires comparable 
financial ratios including earnings-to-price, debt-to-asset, and operating margin. Therefore, if a 
particular set of data does not have any of the financial statement information or stock prices 
required for the ratio calculations, or if these figures are unreasonable, such as when assets, sales 
or debts are negative, the data is eliminated.  
After extracting the required data separately from Compustat and CRSP databases, the 
financial statement information is merged with the stock prices and returns on each April 30
th
. 
More specifically, the financial statement data is merged with the returns in the following year 
to reflect the rationale that the financial statement data is used to form portfolios whose returns 
would not be known until the next year. 
We use companies with a December fiscal yearend and an earnings announcement date 
before the end of April each year. Companies with a December fiscal yearend comprise around 
65% of all data available; also, 96% of the companies with a December fiscal yearend announce 
their earnings before April 30
th
. Employing these two screening criteria, we lost approximately 
37.6% of the available data (1−  0.65 × 0.96 = 0.376). We choose April 30th as the portfolio 
rebalancing date each year because by this time of the year, most companies with a December 
yearend have already announced their earnings and financial statement information, and 
therefore, investors are be able to use this information to form investment strategies. Appendix I 
shows the portfolio rebalance date in past literatures. While Fama and French (1992) and Chen 
and Zhang (1998) have used June 30
th
 as the rebalance date, Basu (1977) and Chen, Kim and 
Zhang (2008) have selected April 1
st
 and March 31
st
 as their portfolio dates.  
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2.2 Ratio Calculation 
As mentioned before in the previous sections, we rebalance three portfolios annually on 
April 30
th
 using earnings-to-price, debt-to-asset, and operating margin ratios. On each April 30
th
, 
we calculate these ratios with the following formulas: 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
In this study, we calculate Earnings-to-Price (EP) ratios instead of Price-Earnings ratio 
to avoid potential problems arising from negative earnings and zero earnings. Fama and French 
(1992), Chen and Zhang (1998) and Campbell and Shiller (1998) have all used the same 
technique in PE calculation. 
If a stock has a split during the period from January to April, the “Cumulative Factors to 
Adjust Price”, a factor from WRDS used specifically for price adjustment purposes, in both 
December and April are used to adjust the April stock price to a “pre-split” price to be used to 
calculate the earnings-to-price ratios.  
After we calculate the above ratios, we form three equally-weighted portfolios with same 
number of companies on April 30
th
 from 1987 to 2006. Portfolio A simply contains the 
companies whose earnings-to-price rank top five percent (5%) of all companies. The firm 
selection for portfolio B and C would first require a way to rank both debt-to-asset and operating 
margin at the same time.  This is accomplished by adding the individual ranks for debt-to-asset 
and operating margin and subsequently ranking this “combined leverage rank”. With these 
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combined leverage ranks, portfolio B is created by first selecting the 20% most-leveraged 
companies and then identifying the 25% of companies with the highest earnings-to-price within 
this group. On the other hand, portfolio C is formed by first selecting the 20% least highly-
leveraged companies and then identifying the 25% of companies with the highest earnings-to-
price within the group. Similar to portfolio A, both portfolio B and C select 5% of the company 
pool at each portfolio rebalancing date (5% = 20% × 25%). 
The amount of data extracted from the Compustat and CRSP databases, along with the 
amount of data lost due to data merging, missing values, and other steps of our study, are shown 
in Diagram 1: Data Processing Stages – Lost Data. 
Diagram 1:   Data Processing Stages – Lost Data 
 
 
 
 
 
From CRSP 
2022165 monthly price 
and stock return data 
From Compustat 
156905 annual financial 
statement data 
167116 computed annual 
return data  
(keeping only April data) 
85337 Merged Data 
Keeping companies 
announcing before April 
30
th
 
74625 - final dataset after 
removing 2007 data 
78558 data after removing 
data missing financial 
statement information 
Figure 1:   Data Processing Stages and Lost Data 
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Table 1:   Portfolio Return Summary 
 
Market 
 
Portfolio A 
 
Portfolio B 
 
Portfolio C 
 Benchmark Low PE Low PE- High Leverage Low PE - Low Leverage 
 
µ 0.137781 Sharpe Ratio 0.148320 Sharpe Ratio 0.136425 Sharpe Ratio 0.184093 Sharpe Ratio 
σ 0.648087 0.135909 0.606248 0.162672 0.578518 0.149909 0.427065 0.314691 
Significant Performance 
 
9 
 
10 
 
12   
Significant Outperformance 
 
6 
 
5 
 
9   
Significant Underperformance 3 
 
5 
 
3   
Figure 2:   Portfolio and Benchmark Return – 1987 to 2006 
 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
market benchmark
high EP 
high EP low Leverage
high EP high Leverage
11 
 
3. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
3.1 Portfolio Returns 
The above TABLE 1:   Portfolio Return Summary provides important statistics for the 
portfolios, such as average portfolio returns, number of significant outperformance and Sharpe 
ratios. A Sharpe ratio is a risk-adjusted return measure calculated using the following equation: 
Sharpe Ratio =
 Annual Return− Risk free rate
 Standard Deviation
 
The portfolio’s annual return used in the calculation is the 20-year average return and the 
standard deviation is the portfolio standard deviation. The risk free rate, calculated at 4.97%, is 
the average of the market yields on US Treasury Securities at 1-year constant maturity from 
1987 to 2006. 
In our analysis, the market benchmark returns are calculated from our final dataset which 
contains 74625 sets of annual data. Each year from 1987 to 2006, we calculate the mean and 
standard deviation with all available stock annual returns to represent the market benchmark. 
Therefore, our benchmark return is an equal-weighted one, which is consistent with our 
investment portfolios. As shown in Appendix II, the average benchmark return over the 20 year 
period is 13.78% and the average standard deviation is 64.81%. This standard deviation is 
higher than what is observed in the US market, averaged at around 30%. If we had use the 
value-weighted portfolio instead of equal-weighted portfolio, and log returns instead of un-
logged returns to calculate the standard deviation, the figure should be more comparable. With 
these two figures, the Sharpe ratio for the benchmark portfolio is computed at 0.1359. 
Portfolio A, which consists of high earnings-to-price stocks, has a mean return of 14.83% 
and an average standard deviation of 60.62%. The Sharpe ratio for portfolio A is 0.1627, higher 
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than that of the benchmark (0.1359). Then, we conduct a student t-test to examine whether 
portfolio A’s return is significantly different from the benchmark return for each year. We 
calculate t-statistics with the following formula: 
 
t− statistic =
X1− X2
  S1
2
N1  +  
S22
N2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
X1 = Portfolio annual return for a certain year     
X2 = Benchmark return for the same year             
S1 = Standard deviation for benchmark returns 
S2 = Standard deviation for portfolio A returns  
N1 = Number of companies in the benchmark     
N2 = Number of companies in the portfolio A      
  
We compare the t-value with a critical value of 1.96, corresponding to a 95% confidence 
level. Appendix III contains the 20 yearly t-statistics over the period. The results show that we 
are 95% confident that 9 out of the 20 returns in portfolio A are significantly different from the 
benchmark return, and 6 out of these 9 returns are positively significant from the benchmark. 
Also, portfolio A’s mean return (14.83%) is higher than the benchmark return (13.78%), but its 
average risk (60.62%), represented by standard deviation, is reduced compared to the 
benchmark (64.81%). The higher portfolio return is consistent with our expectation, but the 
lower standard deviation is inconsistent with the risk hypothesis, which predicts low PE firms to 
be riskier than the market. Results support the market inefficiency hypothesis, because the 
investors undertake less risk but earn higher returns. 
Portfolio B contains high earnings-to-price and high leverage stocks. Its average return 
stands at 13.64% and standard deviation at 57.85%. The Sharpe ratio for portfolio C is 0.1499, 
13 
 
which outperforms the market (0.1359) but underperforms portfolio A (0.1627). According to 
Appendix IV, the portfolio returns reach the bottom on 1998 (-23.36%), and peak on 2003 
(13.64%). The T-test shows that 10 out of the 20 portfolio returns are significantly different 
from the benchmarks, and 5 out of these 10 returns are positively significant, which signals that 
portfolio C both outperforms and underperforms the market five times over the period. 
Therefore, portfolio B (13.64%) does not outperform the market (13.78%), which is inconsistent 
with the general belief that low PE portfolio outperforms the market. The result of standard 
deviation disagrees with the previous expectation that higher leveraged portfolio would be 
riskier than the market, because it is reduced to 57.85% compared to the market (64.81%); this 
outcome contradicts the risk hypothesis. The market inefficiency hypothesis fails here, too, 
since the portfolio is less risky than the market and yield a lower return than the market. The 
market seems to be efficient from portfolio B’s results. 
Portfolio C contains high earnings-to-price and low leverage stocks. Its average return 
over the 20-year period is 18.41% and its average standard deviation is 42.71% (TABLE 1). The 
Sharpe ratio for portfolio C is 0.3147, approximately doubled that of the market and the other 
two portfolios. Appendix V indicates that the data ranges from -21.00% (1998) to 72.88% 
(2003). Student’s t-tests show that 12 out of 20 returns are significantly different from the 
benchmark returns, and 9 out of the 12 are positively significant (Appendix V). Hence, portfolio 
C (18.41%) outperforms the market (13.78%) and has a standard deviation (42.71%) 
considerably lower than that of the market (64.81%). These outcomes are contradictory to our 
expectation, which predicts that lower leveraged portfolio will produce lower return. They are 
also inconsistent with the risk hypothesis, since the risk is notably reduced but the return has 
significantly increased. The market inefficiency hypothesis is again supported, since the results 
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imply that investors can undertake less risk but earn higher return, as indicated by the doubled 
Sharpe ratio. 
 From the above statistics, we observe the superior performance of portfolio C when 
compared to portfolio A and B. First, it stands at a higher annual return (18.41% versus 14.83% 
and 13.64%) and lower standard deviation (42.71% versus 60.62% and 57.85%), implying that 
investors actually can undertake less risk but earn higher return from investing in portfolio C. Its 
risk-adjusted performance measure (0.3147), Sharpe ratio, is also notably higher than that of the 
market (0.1359), portfolio A (0.1627) and portfolio B (0.1499). Secondly, out of the 20 annual 
observations, the portfolio significantly outperforms the market for 9 times, compared to 6 times 
for portfolio A and 5 times for portfolio B.  
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Table 2:   Portfolio Return Summary – Bullish and Bearish Markets 
 
Market 
 
Portfolio A 
 
Portfolio B 
 
Portfolio C 
 
 
Benchmark 
 
- 
 
high 
Leverage 
 
low 
Leverage 
 Year Bearish Bullish Bearish Bullish Bearish Bullish Bearish Bullish 
1987 -0.082338 
 
-0.150066 
 
-0.140491 
 
-0.018496 
 1988 
 
0.148530 
 
0.214131 
 
0.162587 
 
0.230582 
1989 -0.010252 
 
-0.125906 
 
-0.103663 
 
-0.034916 
 1990 
 
0.095967 
 
0.088549 
 
-0.093902 
 
0.125283 
1991 
 
0.181644 
 
0.109600 
 
0.230310 
 
0.181123 
1992 
 
0.143652 
 
0.156053 
 
0.238489 
 
0.212317 
1993 
 
0.133747 
 
0.179086 
 
0.237268 
 
0.141709 
1994 
 
0.070060 
 
0.066682 
 
0.017731 
 
0.157804 
1995 
 
0.357967 
 
0.292558 
 
0.205864 
 
0.374997 
1996 0.017632 
 
0.106676 
 
0.114885 
 
0.280474 
 1997 
 
0.430724 
 
0.414723 
 
0.430633 
 
0.504914 
1998 -0.118198 
 
-0.210076 
 
-0.233569 
 
-0.118300 
 1999 
 
0.295252 
 
0.048444 
 
-0.020996 
 
0.104000 
2000 -0.060749 
 
0.153375 
 
-0.037920 
 
0.278909 
 2001 
 
0.085897 
 
0.194851 
 
0.301907 
 
0.220804 
2002 -0.109654 
 
-0.105121 
 
-0.128849 
 
0.106170 
 2003 
 
0.677480 
 
0.728777 
 
0.727098 
 
0.443219 
2004 
 
0.067884 
 
0.169732 
 
0.154231 
 
0.146723 
2005 
 
0.330862 
 
0.434581 
 
0.472050 
 
0.307244 
2006 
 
0.099502 
 
0.199744 
 
0.194837 
 
0.037308 
         Significant Outperformance 
 
2 4 1 4 4 5 
         Bearish returns -0.060593 
 
-0.055186 
 
-0.088268 
 
0.082307 
 Bullish returns 
 
0.222798 
 
0.235536 
 
0.232722 
 
0.227716 
*bolded numbers indicate portfolio returns that significantly outperform the market benchmark. 
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3.2 Bull vs. Bear Market 
With our 20 years of portfolio returns, we are able to observe the performance of the 
three high earnings-to-price portfolios under bearish and bullish market conditions.  
We define “bear markets” as when the market benchmark has an annual return lower 
than two percent and “bull markets” when the returns are higher than two percent. Applying this 
definition, six out of the 20 years of observation period are bearish years and the rest of the 14 
are bullish periods. TABLE 2: Portfolio Return Summary – Bullish and Bearish Markets 
presents the annual returns for the market benchmark and our three high earnings-to-price 
portfolios from 1987 to 2006. As shown in the table, the market benchmark used to compare our 
portfolios has a bearish-market average return of -6.06% and a bullish-market average return of 
22.28%.  
Portfolio A, selected based on only high earnings-to-price, has a bearish-market average 
return of -5.52% and a bullish-market average return at 23.55%. Compared to the benchmark, 
Portfolio A on average outperform the market slightly during both bullish and bearish periods; 
these outperformance are however insignificant. In the six bearish years, portfolio A 
outperforms the benchmark two times; in the rest 14 bullish years, it has four years of 
outperformance. Cheh, Kim, and Zheng’s (2008) study, which compares the performance of 
high EP and low EP firms in bullish and bearish market, is the most comparable to our Portfolio 
A because high EP is the single selection criterion. In their study, a significant positive 
relationship was observed between earnings-to-price ratio and portfolio returns in a bear market; 
this is not evident in our results. The difference between our Portfolio A and their results can be 
explained by the distinct datasets used in the studies. First, although both the studies chose to 
extract the required data from Compustat and CRSP, the final dataset they employed is only half 
of our size. Consequently, the 17-year overall average annual return they calculated is 
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drastically different from our market benchmark average return (25% compared to our 13%). 
Finally, Cheh, Kim, and Zheng’s (2008) defines year 2000 to 2002, three consecutive years, to 
be the bear market period, while we choose six separated years to be the bearish periods. 
Portfolio B, consisted of companies with high earnings-to-price and high leverage levels, 
has average returns of -8.83% and 23.27% in bearish and bullish market conditions, respectively. 
Compared to the benchmark, portfolio B has only one year of outperformance and on average 
underperform the market by 2.77% during the six bearish years; in the 14 bullish years, it also 
outperform the market four times and barely outperform the bullish-market average return.  
Amongst the three high earnings-to-price portfolios, the performance of portfolio C, 
which contains firms with high earnings-to-price and low leverage levels, is the most 
outstanding. During the bullish times, portfolio B has an average return of 22.77%, slightly 
above the benchmark but marginally lower than that of the portfolio A and B. This deficiency of 
less than one percent, when compared to portfolio A and B, is however insignificant and can be 
compensated by the number of times portfolio C outperform the benchmarks during bullish 
times (Portfolio C outperforms the benchmark five times while portfolio A and B outperform 
four times). 
As discussed earlier, portfolio C has an overall average return of 18.41%, which 
outperforms the returns of the benchmark and the other two portfolios. By separating the 
observation period into bearish and bullish periods, we see that this outperformance, on the most 
part, come from the portfolio’s spectacular bearish-market returns, averaged at 8.23%, which 
outperforms the market by 14.29%. In the six years of bearish markets observed, Portfolio C 
significantly outperforms the benchmark four times, a remarkable result compared to Portfolio 
A and B, which have only two and one years of outperformance, respectively.  
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Overall, all three high earnings-to-price portfolios have slightly outperformed the market 
during bull market periods. However, only portfolio C, the one that also constrain on low 
leverage levels, generates positive average return in bearish market. This indicates that our 
strategy has successfully selected more stable companies with better fundamentals, which we 
believe are essential for stable performance even during market downturns; this portfolio 
characteristic is shown in the reduced portfolio risk.  On the other hand, these stocks should not 
earn as high of a return during bullish years; this is also evidenced in our bullish-market results 
but, again, the deficiency is a minor one. On the whole, this modified earnings-to-price strategy 
serves to be a fine investment strategy regardless of the market condition, but is an especially 
effective one in bear market. 
3.3 Limitations and Recommended Further Research 
During our portfolio selection process, we choose companies with the highest earnings-
to-price ratios from a pool of dataset regardless of what industry the company belongs to. This 
could result in portfolios that heavily concentrate in certain high earnings-to-price industries; as 
a consequence, other undervalued companies with relatively higher earnings-to-price ratios in 
their industries might be overlooked.  Therefore, we would recommend ranking companies by 
earnings-to-price ratio in every industry when high earnings-to-price portfolios are formed. 
With this alternative approach, the portfolio is likely to include a wider variety of industries, 
provide different outcomes, and potentially add value to our study. 
In addition, our portfolios are rebalanced annually because the information extracted 
from annual financial statement s is the most reliable and accessible to investors in general. 
However, past literatures have shown distinct results when the portfolio returns are observed 
over longer intervals. Therefore, in a similar manner, our study can be modified by rebalancing 
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the portfolio more and less frequently to observe whether the same strategies would lead to 
different conclusions. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we review past literatures related to earnings-to-price ratio to observe 
whether investors can use only earnings-to-price ratio to form investment strategies to earn 
higher returns. We propose to augment the traditional earnings-to-price investment strategy by 
adding two selection criteria that measures the companies’ risk exposure: debt-to-asset ratio and 
operating margin ratio.  
Using 20 years of financial statement data and financial market records, we form three 
high earnings-to-price portfolios with different degrees of risk exposure and rebalance them 
every year. Then, we compare the portfolio returns over the 20-year interval with the market 
benchmark and analyze the portfolio performances in both bullish and bearish market conditions. 
Among the portfolios, we find that the portfolio with high earnings-to-price, high 
operating margin, and low debt ratio to be superior as it produces an excess return of 4.63% 
reducing the portfolio risk drastically.  More specifically, we observe that the improved return is 
primarily resulted from the portfolio’s outstanding bearish-market returns (averaged at 8.23%, 
compared to the benchmark at -6.06%). According to our results, this strategy should serve to 
create a superior bear market portfolio which consistently yields positive return despite the 
market condition.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I:  Portfolio Rebalance Date in Previous Literature 
 
  
Literature  Portfolio Rebalance Date 
Basu (1977) April 1 
Fama and French (1992) June 30 
Chen and Zhang (1998) June 30 
Beneda (2002)  December 31 
Cheh, Kim and Zhang (2008) March 31 
21 
 
Appendix II: Market Benchmark Return Summary 
 
year num annret stdev 
1987 2397 -0.082338 0.363323 
1988 2524 0.148530 0.438983 
1989 2418 -0.010252 0.428800 
1990 2416 0.095967 0.571501 
1991 2489 0.181644 0.714485 
1992 2826 0.143652 0.538099 
1993 3095 0.133747 0.528198 
1994 3743 0.070060 0.526404 
1995 4165 0.357967 0.778330 
1996 4545 0.017632 0.500259 
1997 5189 0.430724 0.748355 
1998 5004 -0.118198 0.743903 
1999 4726 0.295252 1.286343 
2000 5342 -0.060749 0.638331 
2001 5375 0.085897 0.690102 
2002 4698 -0.109654 0.762766 
2003 4417 0.677480 1.148670 
2004 4428 0.067884 0.456727 
2005 4682 0.330862 0.664319 
2006 4629 0.099502 0.433841 
    
 
Average 0.137781 0.648087 
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Appendix III: Portfolio A Return Summary – High EP Portfolio 
 
year EPn EPmean EPstd t Significance 
Positive 
Significance 
1987 116 -0.150066 0.282647 -2.483419 1 0 
1988 121 0.214131 0.525743 1.350168 0 0 
1989 115 -0.125906 0.351124 -3.413232 1 0 
1990 115 0.088549 0.674042 -0.116057 0 0 
1991 119 0.109600 0.653210 -1.170145 0 0 
1992 133 0.156053 0.642979 0.218850 0 0 
1993 145 0.179086 0.493410 1.077932 0 0 
1994 173 0.066682 0.468782 -0.092134 0 0 
1995 195 0.292558 0.532140 -1.636448 0 0 
1996 214 0.106676 0.459624 2.758171 1 1 
1997 245 0.414723 0.637519 -0.380686 0 0 
1998 237 -0.210076 0.838394 -1.656489 0 0 
1999 223 0.048444 0.939007 -3.762013 1 0 
2000 247 0.153375 0.884604 3.759217 1 1 
2001 254 0.194851 0.731222 2.326257 1 1 
2002 221 -0.105121 0.460236 0.137810 0 0 
2003 206 0.728777 0.792957 0.886127 0 0 
2004 206 0.169732 0.530133 2.711006 1 1 
2005 215 0.434581 0.676178 2.200885 1 1 
2006 213 0.199744 0.551015 2.617986 1 1 
       
 
Average 0.148320 0.606248 Sum 9 6 
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Portfolio A: Ratio Statistics 
year EPmean DAmean OMmean EPmin 
1987 0.231254 0.284757 0.174694 0.143673 
1988 0.298562 0.325793 0.157402 0.162210 
1989 0.324674 0.315548 0.184037 0.172929 
1990 0.516791 0.305443 0.171303 0.178290 
1991 0.425656 0.296407 0.169724 0.149508 
1992 0.212809 0.291436 0.215277 0.123727 
1993 0.596834 0.254174 0.186146 0.126000 
1994 0.607154 0.317137 0.199858 0.133256 
1995 0.215129 0.226211 0.207847 0.132923 
1996 0.315499 0.270154 0.210370 0.126452 
1997 0.230059 0.249039 0.215976 0.125957 
1998 0.181928 0.242702 0.078430 0.101765 
1999 0.347986 0.280313 0.091839 0.136471 
2000 0.292743 0.320892 -0.075591 0.166154 
2001 0.336711 0.291120 0.204881 0.158672 
2002 0.654804 0.294061 -0.051229 0.116685 
2003 0.346846 0.323702 0.178877 0.130435 
2004 1.165244 0.331283 0.232467 0.111201 
2005 0.280238 0.253533 0.164944 0.127605 
2006 0.201741 0.280371 0.157341 0.109387 
     
 
0.389133 0.287704 0.153730 
  
  
24 
 
 
Appendix IV: Portfolio B Return Summary – High EP High Leverage 
Portfolio 
 
year EPhighDn EPhighDmean EPhighDstd t Significance 
Positive 
Significance 
1987 116 -0.140491 0.377439 -1.623416 0 0 
1988 122 0.162587 0.505632 0.301634 0 0 
1989 115 -0.103663 0.357951 -2.707596 1 0 
1990 116 -0.093902 0.387577 -5.020699 1 0 
1991 119 0.230310 0.548252 0.931252 0 0 
1992 134 0.238489 0.624451 1.727899 0 0 
1993 146 0.237268 0.654791 1.881645 0 0 
1994 173 0.017731 0.506419 -1.326400 0 0 
1995 196 0.205864 0.576536 -3.544642 1 0 
1996 214 0.114885 0.457486 3.025771 1 1 
1997 246 0.430633 0.549378 -0.002508 0 0 
1998 235 -0.233569 0.370793 -4.374227 1 0 
1999 223 -0.020996 0.948782 -4.774766 1 0 
2000 245 -0.037920 0.589138 0.590812 0 0 
2001 253 0.301907 0.785083 4.298934 1 1 
2002 221 -0.128849 0.635604 -0.434461 0 0 
2003 207 0.727098 0.767197 0.885163 0 0 
2004 206 0.154231 0.503630 2.414980 1 1 
2005 215 0.472050 0.992810 2.064094 1 1 
2006 213 0.194837 0.431410 3.152632 1 1 
       
 
Average 0.136425 0.578518 Sum 10 5 
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Portfolio B: Ratio Statistics 
year EPmean DAmean OMmean EPmin DAmin OMmax 
1987 0.124247 0.450153 0.062479 0.051594 0.236445 0.157491 
1988 0.147504 0.476184 0.065864 0.071667 0.225261 0.176436 
1989 0.153151 0.479068 0.077160 0.064646 0.237686 0.174654 
1990 0.127584 0.490879 0.082983 0.064000 0.215752 0.168416 
1991 0.253938 0.459937 0.078913 0.054570 0.249586 0.159756 
1992 0.082066 0.444630 0.064764 0.030629 0.151943 0.139833 
1993 0.378325 0.420586 0.053493 0.041690 0.120478 0.164277 
1994 0.351334 0.455232 0.063436 0.047610 0.154610 0.170070 
1995 0.120259 0.419780 0.078973 0.059108 0.159163 0.209880 
1996 0.208475 0.406538 0.081853 0.036923 0.170563 0.190308 
1997 0.113170 0.445239 0.078444 0.039588 0.158049 0.201847 
1998 0.082750 0.453794 0.035399 0.030476 0.210409 0.203031 
1999 0.212084 0.486993 -0.004642 0.027481 0.172585 0.201312 
2000 0.120883 0.488465 -0.080724 0.018166 0.073387 0.194290 
2001 0.154432 0.465991 0.061769 0.024954 0.159999 0.195883 
2002 0.313711 0.475152 -0.111562 -0.005226 0.167278 0.203833 
2003 0.205486 0.456647 0.080710 0.019048 0.177081 0.228130 
2004 1.018239 0.448000 0.071948 0.028509 0.124159 0.233267 
2005 0.165652 0.392625 -0.017834 0.048509 0.084313 0.230219 
2006 0.096500 0.425550 0.092945 0.044321 0.122387 0.233237 
       Average 0.221489 0.452072 0.045819 
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Appendix V: Portfolio C Return Summary – High EP Low Leverage 
Portfolio 
 
year EPlowDn EPlowDmean EPlowDstd t Significance 
Positive 
Significance 
1987 116 -0.018496 0.223892 2.892342 1 1 
1988 122 0.230582 0.370861 2.364987 1 1 
1989 114 -0.034916 0.379743 -0.673496 0 0 
1990 116 0.125283 0.430707 0.703926 0 0 
1991 119 0.181123 0.401485 -0.013196 0 0 
1992 133 0.212317 0.460747 1.666038 0 0 
1993 146 0.141709 0.425771 0.218180 0 0 
1994 173 0.157804 0.399317 2.780645 1 1 
1995 195 0.374997 0.335272 0.633810 0 0 
1996 214 0.280474 0.320391 11.366431 1 1 
1997 245 0.504914 0.490173 2.248568 1 1 
1998 237 -0.118300 0.930806 -0.001654 0 0 
1999 223 0.104000 0.682378 -3.873223 1 0 
2000 246 0.278909 0.474452 10.787747 1 1 
2001 255 0.220804 0.388790 5.168223 1 1 
2002 221 0.106170 0.334971 8.588015 1 1 
2003 206 0.443219 0.513869 -5.892415 1 0 
2004 206 0.146723 0.282392 3.783412 1 1 
2005 215 0.307244 0.422716 -0.776412 0 0 
2006 213 0.037308 0.272566 -3.151579 1 0 
       
 
Average 0.184093 0.427065 Sum 12 9 
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Portfolio C: Ratio Statistics 
year EPmean DAmean OMmean EPmin DAmax OMmin 
1987 0.125217 0.104603 0.311501 0.088756 0.304091 0.110361 
1988 0.148394 0.086583 0.324801 0.096098 0.304503 0.116183 
1989 0.173251 0.096317 0.318819 0.107380 0.293233 0.105272 
1990 0.388813 0.111600 0.300737 0.112727 0.331554 0.121922 
1991 0.154621 0.082246 0.325780 0.098423 0.288337 0.099071 
1992 0.112187 0.073960 0.323994 0.080000 0.302303 0.090313 
1993 0.111111 0.058393 0.332237 0.079688 0.274718 0.085224 
1994 0.125966 0.065595 0.354833 0.085180 0.251078 0.087135 
1995 0.120823 0.050512 0.372981 0.094815 0.211566 0.115657 
1996 0.111500 0.041677 0.361032 0.082051 0.215590 0.122449 
1997 0.111412 0.036684 0.327235 0.075443 0.232034 0.098272 
1998 0.092466 0.037018 0.314659 0.060000 0.267897 0.082500 
1999 0.116566 0.044573 0.301409 0.081280 0.256118 0.085362 
2000 0.146243 0.064697 0.344168 0.096111 0.286518 0.065556 
2001 0.131408 0.058298 0.363579 0.090247 0.296481 0.018814 
2002 0.114827 0.075540 0.406479 0.071680 0.297001 0.030840 
2003 0.114067 0.063648 0.371795 0.075437 0.240732 0.069569 
2004 0.094034 0.076431 0.445614 0.067420 0.248395 0.097516 
2005 0.105269 0.057636 0.420409 0.070000 0.229324 0.099622 
2006 0.098798 0.063788 0.448206 0.065949 0.218644 0.096901 
       Average 0.134849 0.067490 0.353514 
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